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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CREST MOTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

Case No.
9958

ALEXANDER S. FISH,
Defendant and Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts
as set forth by the appellant in his brief since the
evidence was conflicting and the facts as stated by the
Appellant represent basically his testimony in the
trial court with the emphasis placed on his theory of
the case, ignoring the familiar principle requiring a
fair statement of the facts upon which the decision of
the trial court was predicated and based upon which
judgment was awarded the Respondent.
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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

In February, 1962, Respondent purchased a 1960
Cadillac and a 1956 Chevrolet from the Appellant
as the result of a telephone conversation between the
Appellant and Mr. Dee Timothy wherein the Appellant wanted to sell the automobiles to Respondent
and indicated that he, the Appellant, had bought the
Cadillac off the curb (R.30) and that he had taken
the 1956 Chevrolet in as his commission on the sale
of a new car ( R. 31 ) .
The Appellant, Alexander Fish, had his place of
business in Detroit, Michigan, while Respondent has
~ts place of business in Salt Lake City (R. 28), hence
negotiations for the sale and purchase were conducted by telephone.
After the parties had agreed on a purchase price,
$2,700.00 _for the Cadillac and $300.00 for the Chevrolet, if purchased together, (R. 30, 31 ), the deal was
consumated, and Appellant shipped the cars to Salt
Lake City, by rail.. (R. 37).
Subsequently, the Respondent had repairs made
on the Cadillac, totalling $355.20, and paid transportation on the automobile totaling $t06.80. (R. 15,
16).
Thereaf~e.n .R~spondent

sold the Cadillac., _and
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when it was discovered that the vehicle was in fact
a stolen automobile, the Respondent was obliged to
return it to its rightful owner which entailed repurchase of the vehicle. (R. 34)

Mr. Kenneth E. Schefski, the owner and manager
of the Independent Auto Damage and Appraisers
company, testified that he examined the Cadillac that
the serial number stamped on the frame definitely
established that it was an automobile Serial No.
60L059259, (R. 25, 26), whereas the title furnished
by Appellant supposedly covering this vehicle was
the title to an automobile Serial Number 60L030424.
(Ex. 3).

Mr. Fish, the Appellant, indicated in his testimony
that the automobile had been stolen from a Cadillac
dealer in Michigan, and the door plate identification
number,. which is a _small plastic plate, had been
removed, and another, plate attached, with a number
correspondi!lg with the title he provided the Respondent. , (R. 97). ·
The trial court ruled for the Plaintiff and found
that Plaintiff had purchased the automobile from Mr.
Fish, the Appellant.
Other material facts will be set out as they relate
more specifically to the points raised by th~ Appellant as a basis for his appeal.
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Statement of Points

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT PURCHASED THE AUTOMOBILE IN QUESTION
FROM THE APPELLANT IS CONCWSIVE OF POINT I
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF RELATING TO THE QUESTION
OF AGENCY.

II

ASSUMING THAT AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP DID
EXIST, TKEN APPELLANT WAS SO NEGLIGENT IN THE
PURCHASE OF THIS VEHICLE THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD
HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RECOVER.

·•it··

..
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The findings of the Trial Court that Respondent purchased the automobile in question from the Appellant is
conclusive of Point I of Appellant's brief relating to the
question of agency..

The Court having found that the Respondent purchased the 1960 Cadillac from the Appellant, under
the familiar principle that the evidence will be
examined to determine its sufficiency to support that
determination,. and that this Court will not substitute
its analysis of the evidence and the weight thereof
for that of the trial court, the proper inquiry is as to
whether there is competent evidence to support the
determination of the trial court. 1 It becomes obvious
~herefore, that Appellan~'s statement at page 10 of
his brief that "It is considered that the record clearly
cliscloses that the Defendant served as agent-factor of
the Plaintiff in the purchase of the 1960 Cadillac
automobile concerned herein," is erroneous, and an
assumption, which flies in the face of the scope of
the inquiry of this court. If there is competent evidence from which the Court could find as it did, the
judgment must be sustained. 2
1. Dalton v. W adler, 11 Ut. 2d 84, 385 P. 2d 69; Chris_tensen
v. Christensen, 9 Ut. 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101; Nau7oks v.
Suhrmann, 9 Ut. 2d 84, 337 P. 2d. 967; Child v. Child, 8 Ut.
2d 261, 332 P. 2d. 981.
2. Storr v. Grant, 2 Ut. 2d 421, 276 P. 2d 489; Christensen v.
Christensen, sapra.
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The evidence which sustains the Court's ruling is
as follows:
Mr. Dee Timothy, testified that in the telephone
conversation he had with the Appellant concerning
this automobile Mr. Fish represented to him that he,
Mr. Fish, had purchased the Cadillac off the curb
CR. 30),that Mr. Fish quoted him a price of $2,700 for
the car in a package deal CR. 30, 31 ) , that he, Mr.
Timothy, said that "For this year and model of car
this is an awfully cheap price" CR. 30), that Mr. Fish
replied that this is what he thought before he bought
it, SO· he sent it down and had it checked by the police
before he bought it. C. 30, 120) ; that the telephone
conversations took place on February 21, 1962, and
that he agreed to purchase the two automobiles CR.
31), and made arrangements to wire the money to
J.V[t. Fish's account at his Detroit bank as per instructions from Mr. Fish CR. 31, 47, 48).
Mr. Timothy also testified that as to the 1956
Chevrolet included in the package deal at $300.00,
that he had been offered this car on prior occasions
by Mr. Fish who said that he had sold it new theretofore and had now taken it back as his commission on
the sale of a new automobile to the same people
<R. 31).
Exhibit 1, is the check to First Security Bank for
furtds to be wired to Alexander Fish, dated February
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~ l,

1962 for payment in full for a 1960 Cad. S. deVille,
56 Chev BA 4 Dr. Exhibit 2 is the draft forwarded to
the account of Alexander Fish at Manufacturers National Bank in Detroit. These funds arrived on February 23, 1962. ( R. 33) .

The title to the 1960 Cadillac reveals that it was
notarized February 21st, by Alexander Fish. Fish
admitted that he gave his personal check to the owner
of the 1960 Cadillac in payment thereof, ( R. 84, 96)
although he contended that his account was without
funds to cover the check until Respondent's draft
reached his bank ( R. 96).
Neither the 1956 Chevrolet title nor the 1960
Cadillac title were in the name of Mr. Fish when
received by the Respondent, but Mr. Timothy explained that this is a usual business practice whenever an automobile is taken in, and that "The usual
practice is that you never change the title into your
own name. Regardless of whether the title comes
from Mr. Fish or a private title, you only hold the
title until you make sure it is signed off correctly.
You only hold the title in your possession until you
sell it, and then the State issues a new title to the
customer or whoever buys the car. (R. 35, 36). As
Mr. Timothy stated, if the Court were to deal with
him~ the transaction would be handled the same way.
<R. 36).
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On cross examination, Mr. Timothy re-iterated
that Mr .. Fish had agreed to sell him cars CR. 40), that
Mr. Fish sold him cars, perhaps as many as 25 CR.
41), that on one occasion, when he was in Detroit,
Mr. Fish personally delivered him two titles out of
his wallet, representing two automobiles that he purchased from Mr. Fish while there. (R. 43).
Mr. Timothy indicated that he never had paid
Mr. Fish a commission on any transaction, only the
price for the automobile, which Mr. Fish quoted him
as the purchase price of the car ( R. 45) .
1\tlr. Timothy indicated also, that he had visited
Mr. Fish, the Appellant, at his home in Detroit, that
Mr. Fish had automobiles in his yard and on a lot
immediately adjoining his home CR. 50); that in fact,
while there he purchased two automobiles from Mr.
Fish which were: parked on the adjoining lot CR. 50).
It is clear that the Respondent purchased the 1960
Cadillac from the Appellant, just as he purchased
the 1.956 Chevrolet from· the Appellant, and many
other vehicles, including two while in Detroit, and
that the evidence amply sustains the decision of the
trial court that there was an independent buyer-seller
relationship between the parties in dealing with the
Cadillac, and not an agency relationship.
At page 11 of his brief, Appellant cites the Restate-
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1nent of Agency, 2nd Ed. Sec .. 14, which sets up
factors indicating that no agency exists ( 1) that he
is to receive a fixed price for the property irrespective
of the price paid by him, [This is. the exact fact in
the instant case, where the price quoted was $2,7 00.00
for the Cadillac and $300.00, for the Chevrolet (R. 30,
31) l (2) that he acts in his· own name and receives
title to- the property which he is thereafter to transfer
Un the instant case, Mr. Fish received the title and
forwarded it to- the Respondent in keeping with the
usual business practice which dictates that the dealer
does not appear on the tide, but of course, Gould if
he so desired] (3) that he has an independent
business in buying and selling· similar· property [In
the instant case the testimony clearly establishes that
this is precisely· what Mr~ Fish does ( R. 30, 31 ) 1.

It is true, that Mr. Fish soughtby his testimony
to establish that Respondent paid a commission on
this transaction and that the commission was stated
to the Respondent in advance (R. 76}. ·This was flatly
denied by Respondent (11'7, 45,), and on cross exa-mination. Mr~ Fish left some question a bout his prior
statem·ent (R. 86; 8 7) .
Since the trial court had. the oppo~ity to ob-

serve the witnesses; and· evaluate· their demeanor as
well as their testimony, these factual questions havealr~ady been. reselved favorably to-. the Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1{)

and his credibility as compared to that of the Appellant firmly established. 3
Appellant, at page 12 of his brief recites several
sections of the Michigan law, excluded by the trial
court by reason of lack of proper foundation CR. 66),
and equally inappropriate in Appellant's brief before
this Court, as pursuasive of the proposition that Appellant was not the owner of the vehicle he bought in
Michigan, and that some one else must have been
the owner, sincehe would have been violating some
of those statutes if it were otherwise.
Counsel for Respondent, suggested on cross-examination of Mr. Fish that there . were perhaps
reasons that Mr. Fish proceeded as he did to avoid
putting titles in his own name, and although Mr. Fish
was quick to deny those reasons, they are perhaps as
pursuasive reasons as now suggested by Appellant in
his brief. ( R. 109) .
Certainly, the statutes of Michigan whatever they
may say do not change the fact that the trial court
believed the Respondent when he said that he purchased this automobile from Mr. Fish7 and that Mr.
Fish had told him that he, Mr. Fish, had bought if off
the curb. CR. 30). What complications this provides
for Mr. Fish with the Michigan law is not the con3. Page, v. Federal Security Insurance Co., 8 Ut. 2d 226, 332
P. 2d 666; Child v. Child, 8 Ut. 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981.-
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cern of this case, nor is the Michigan law probative
of the facts of the case.
Appellant cites American Jurisprudence, Brokers,
Sec. 4, and Section 2, at p. 14 of his brief. However,
the findings of the Court clearly take the present case
out of the factual situations covered by either.
Similarly with the citation of American -Jurisprudence, Factors, Section .6, and 35 C.J.S. Brokers, Section 4. While probably good statements of general
law, none is applicable to the facts here established
by the trial court.
A brief statement of the facts of the case of Twohig,
vs. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 118 Fed. Supp. 322,
cited by the Appellant serves at once to distinguish
that case. In the cas.e, the Plaintiff became the agent
of Mid States Packing Company for the purchasing of
cattle on a commission basis. In the present case, the
court found from substantial and competent evidence, that Respondent purchased the automobile
from the Appellant, negating any agency theory
advanced by Appellant.
The cases Bashford vs. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co.,
123 Cal. App, 204, 11 P. 2d- 51; and Couturie vs.
Porsch, 134 S.W. 413 are similarly inapplicable; and
in the case of Beakley vs. Ranier, 78 S.W, 702, the
question of agency or lack thereof plays no part in the
decision.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
·A case of infinitely more assistance to the Court is
the case of Pashalian vs. Big-4 Chevrolet Company,
Inc., (Mo. App.) 348 S.W. 2d 628. In that case,
Pashalian contacted a used car dealer named Lesch
to purchase a 1958 Chevrolet Bel-Air four-door Sedan.
Pashalian actually instigated the transaction in that
case, however. Lesch took a deposit and gave him an
allowance for his trade-in. Lesch then went to a new
car dealer, the Defendant, and told the salesman that
he wanted to buy such a car and got a quotation on
the price. Thereafter, Lesch told the Defendant the
name of the person in whose name the papers shpuld
be made, and the Defendant Big-4 executed the necessary documents direct to Pashalian. Lesch gave his
check to Big-4, and Pashalian gave his check to Lesch,
in payment for the car and received the car. The
Lesch check was subsequently returned by the bank
marked "account closed." Pashalian instituted a suit
for conversion after the Defendant Big-4 obtained
possession of the automobile when it was returned for
servicing. As in the case at bar, Pashalian, the buyer,
dealt solely with Lesch, and the Defendant contended
the Lesch was the agent of Pashalian in obtaining
the automobile from the Big-4 Chevrolet Company.
The court in considering the question of agency,
stated first, that there is never. a presumption of
agency, arid the burden of establishing it is on the
party asserting it and by whom it is alleged to exist.
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The court concluded from the evidence that
Plaintiff dealt solely with Lesch, and thought he was
buyian.g from Lesch; that there was no evidence that
Plaintiff even knew the Defendant. The Defendant
knew that it was transferring title directly to
Pashalian., but it had a dlliect transaction with Lesch.
The court after reviewing the evidence was of the
opinion that there was nothing about the transaction
which would justify a finding, that any agency existed
between Pashalian and Lesch, and affinned a judgment for the Plaintiff, Pashalian.

In the case at bar, Respondent thought he was
cdealing directly with Fis~ did not know the party
prior in the transaction to Fish, and the title passed
directly from the prior party to ~e Plaintiff.
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POINT II
Assuming that an agency relationship did exist, then
Appellant was so negligent in the purchase of this
vehicle that Plaintiff would have been entitled to recover.

Appellant's second point is completely outside the
decision of the Trial Court. It assumes that Appellant
was Respondent's agent, that the purchase was from
~nother by Appellant as agent for the Respondent,
and 'then asserts that the record establishes reasonable care and diligence on the part of the Appellant
in handling the purchase;
·, Respondent asserts that the decision of the trial
~our{ was and· .is conclusive of Appellartt's second

point. However, the Respondent's testimony establishing lack of diligence on the part ,of the Appellant
is such that it is clear that Appellant could not prevail
even if he was correct on the question of agency.
Respondent's testimony establishing lack of diligence on the part of the Appellant is that he represented that he had taken the vehicle to the police for
inspection when in fact he had not (R. 30, 75); that
all he did was call the police station and read them
what was on the title (R. 75, 76, 99, 100), from
which, naturally, nothing could be determined about
the automobile itself; that he at no time examined
the permanent number stamped in the frame of the
automobile, but only looked at the plastic number
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on the door fra1ne ( R. 93), which is removable being
merely screwed on ( R. 93), and this despite his testimony that he "figured something was wrong" (R.
75}; that he called Mr. Timothy and said "Stop wiring the money. Wait until I call you back. It doesn't
look good on it. And the guy just doesn't look right
to me." <R. 76). On cross examination he re-iterated
this feeling that something was wrong an.d that his
experience as a dealer caused him to have this feeling
(R. 92).
Mr. Timothy, on behalf of Respondent testified
that he had been a dealer for three years (R. 117)
that if he were suspicious of a vehicle he would know
where to find the permanent number on the frame
and that it was open to public view by opening the
hood. Mr. Fish with at least ten years experience
(R. 66) said he had never seen one and wouldn't
know where to look ( R. 98) . Mr. Schefski, who made
the positive identification of the vehicle examined the
serial number stamped on the frame rail ( R. 24, 25) .
It is submitted, that even if the facts of agency
we~e

as asserted by the Appellant, that this evidence
sufficiently establishes suspicious circumstances
known to the agent which would require positive
steps on his part in relation to the automobile itself,
to establish physical identification of the vehicle on
behalf of his principal.
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CONCLUSION

It is submitted by the Respondent that the judgment of the trial Court is amply sustained by the
evidence, that there was no error on the part of the
trial court in ruling as he did that the Respondent
purchased the automobile in question from the Appellant, and that the relationship between them was
that . of buyer and seller, and that accordingly, the
judgment is fully sustainable. It is further submitted
that even if the court were to determine that an
agency relationship existed which it did not, that
even in such event, the Respondent would be entitled
to recover based upon the negligence of the alleged
agent.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH A. SHEFFIELD
534 South 2nd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD
916 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for the Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

